El Adde - you won't forget that name in this lifetime

As I stated in my post El Adde the name of the town in which an AMISOM outpost manned by KDF was attached on Friday, January 15th 2016 will remain in my mind at least a place that will live in infamy and here's why.

I'll break it down into the following four sections, based on what has been released in the mainstream media (and not so main), internet research and my understanding. I'll also state here for the record that I have not been in contact with any service members of the disciplined forces neither am I one myself. I'm just asking questions:

1. Base Construction
2. Supplies - Logistics
3. Combat Support
4. Crisis Management Response

I've looked using Google Maps for the town of El Adde but it doesn't exist - the one that does is Busaar, Geddo Somalia - which from media reports is quite near El Adde. El Adde is the name of the newest district in South Western Somalia according to Wikipedia so your guess is as good as mine if El Adde is a town as well as a district in Geddo. What I do know for sure is the town exists and there is a structure that looks like a new base near it - but because I have no independent confirmation what is there - I will terminate this line of here.

1. Base Construction

The Gate: We've been told the base was breached by ALS suicide bombers (see my last post) - based on what was learned from the Burundi & Uganda based attacks - the attackers shouldn't have been able to drive at speed at those gates (if they did) there should have been concrete barriers at the base gate to slow down vehicles by making them navigate through the concrete barriers that make you slow down and turn to get through. That section of the gate should have been covered by multiple weapons of different caliber in fixed positions - in addition to the weapons carried by the sentries manning the gates. The area should have been well lit and vehicles should have been forced to navigate the gate one at a time - especially unknown vehicles - using the physical obstructions. 

With three VBIED's (see my last article) the attackers would have been forced to blow them up together in an attempt to clear the concrete barriers - which would have blocked the gate or blow them up one at a time (driving over the previous detonation crater to get deeper - a challenge) - still defenders should have had time with a properly constructed gate structure - to repulse or negate the effect of those VBIED's instead of as we've been told them being able to breach the gate (check mainstream media) - in my opinion. 

Base Perimeter: learning from what ALS did to the AMISOM base manned by UPDF, the base should have been secured by at the minimum multiple rings of physical barriers, in three to four concentric rings , earth berms, sand or stone filled bastions (Hesco Bastion) and a final ring of concrete barriers.  Each of these rings should have increased in height with overlapping arcs of fire (from em-placed weapons) and should probably been mined (manually triggered electronic mines at the vulnerable points) - in my opinion. 
There should even have been a plan for the base occupants to have collapsing fields of fire in the event the perimeters were compromised. 

Perimeter Shape: the shape of the base should have been circular or oval - to prevent attackers from focusing fire on a corner from two different angles but still allowing defenders to cover each other and focus their fire on the same area. From what I've seen online (Google maps) this was the case. 

Fields of Fire: outside the last base perimeter the area outside the first third base perimeter should have then been cleared of vegetation and rocks for a further distance of 200 meters. This area should always have been kept clear of vegetation and then the weapons in fixed positions (mortars and machine guns) should have been ranged to fire at this area (this means the settings to drop a mortar at 150 meters 100% of the time would have been known and marked in the gun emplacements). To counter the threat VIED's - this area should have been mined with anti-vehicle mines - pressure activated (meaning you'd have to drive a vehicle of 1 ton of more over the mine to detonate it - keeps the population safe as well - there are no one ton camels) - the area around the camp would naturally have been marked dangerous in Somali, Kiswahili, Arabic and English.


Mortar Batteries: the base should have had at least two batteries of mortars with a range of 100 - 2000 meters. These batteries should have been ranged the day they were set up. Each batter should have been in easy reach of a magazine. If each battery had 5 mortars and there were two batteries for the whole camp covering different sectors, that's an impressive rate of fire - considering again ALS didn't have entrenched positions outside the base. 




In my opinion the base construction followed those simple rules - the attackers would have had a very hard time breaching the base perimeter - even if there were 80 or so defendants (a company - check media articles)  

2. Supplies - Logistics
The military are masters at logistics and are able to get a pencil from Nairobi all the way to Kismayo where it's needed or a T72 from Ukraine to Nairobi. As with any logistics scenario there are re-order levels (the amount at which more supplies are requested), minimum stock levels (the level below which stores should never drop). If it were up to me as rule of thumb the reorder level for ammunition should have been 7 days. This means that when the base as seven days of ammunition left (7 days of patrols, attacks and drills) the supplies chief would order additional ammunition from the bases logistics base (told you the military is super efficient). If the minimum stock level is three days and assuming the base was at that level - they should have had enough ammunition to fire every single weapon on the base for three days without running out. As a a result the base shouldn't have run out ammunition after a fire fight that lasted a day. Additionally KDF should have had a protocol for emergency resupply of a base under attack - by air drop. The base weapons shouldn't have run out of ammo after one day. 

Taking into account what I've laid out in 1 & 2  ALS should have suffered significant losses attacking the base - even with mass numbers of 500 fighters (without armor, without air support, and without extensive ammunition stores) because KDF wouldn't let ALS build an ammo base near them right? 

The weapons of ALS would have been out ranged by the emplaced weapons of KDF, an AK 47 has a range of 350 meters, an M4 & G3 a range of 500 meters (base models). Taking this into account - they ALS with trees and stones for cover have to get to within 340 meters of the base to shoot effectively - unless they all had light machine guns while the KDF would be behind concrete cover and can shoot at anything within 450 meters effectively (not counting mortars) - do you see how ALS would be having a super bad day? I know having mortars raining down on their heads, anti vehicle mines exploding underneath would not have made ALS more courageous.... 

So what happened - how was this not the case - was the base poorly protected and supplied?

3. Combat Support
El Adde wasn't the only AMISOM base in Somalia it wasn't the furthest KDF outpost in Somalia - it was supported - it had another base supplies came from and it had a bigger base (battalion or division HQ) from where support when an attack happened would come from. This support would take two forms Close Air Support (thank you Hollywood) and a Quick Reaction Force. The company at El Adde should have had redundant forms of communication to their battalion HQ or if they were the battalion HQ then comms to Division and the DoD. It goes without saying these comm channels should have been manned on the receiving end 24//365. So the moment a distress call was received steps should have been taken to activate immediately the forces below:

Close Air Support - is air planes (jets or helicopters) fully fueled and armed for  air to ground missions (KDF has air superiority in Somalia) either in the air or able to get airborne in five to ten minutes. This force would then arrive on station and under the direction of the unit requesting for help rain unholy hell fire and brimstone on the enemy (ALS) heads - again ruining their day. The distance from Nanyuki to Busaar is 653kms the F-5E has a range of 1405kms on internal tanks - meaning it could fly to Busaar and back on internal tanks and still fly for 200kms around the town (loiter time) using internal tanks would free all there external hard points to carry weapons - enabling KDF to bring a lot of pain to bear on ALS. At maximum cruise speed they should have been over El Added in 45 minutes after takeoff. Using a center tank on the F5 would enable the planes to spend more time over the combat area bringing the hurt. KDF should have then had resources to have Close Air Support on station around the base until - the attack was repulsed and the enemy retreated. Get my drift?  Lets not talk about helicopter support  - this examination by itself is enough to prove my point.
Quick Reaction Force -  a column of troops in armored vehicles who can come to the support of base or unit of soldiers under attack.  This force would either be able to reinforce or evacuate a force under attack (such as the El Adde unit). A force arriving behind an enemy attacking a base would be caught between two forces and mowed down. I don't know where the nearest QRF was - I just know there should have been one nearby. This force is launched after assessment has been done that the it's determined the base needs relief. 

So what happened - how was this not the case - was the base poorly protected and supported?

4. Crisis Management
Brace yourself this is where it gets for me really annoying, here I feel the GOK lost the plot and I'll explain:
Information Release: I felt that GOK reacted like they were allergic to releasing information about the attack as a result they denied (which came across as a lie) and ended up having to confirm what third party news sites and unverified sources including the ALS later - thus playing catch up. They let the enemy lead the media war, they lost credibility and were on the back foot - making the situation worse for families of soldiers - no I won't address where or what the President did. 

In my opinion if the GOK said 
0800hrs "This morning at 0530hrs our base was attacked in El Adde, our troops requested support - which was dispatched and we are monitoring the situation, more updates to follow. Our thoughts and prayers are with the soldiers and their families"
1100hrs "An update to our briefing this morning - our base in El Adde requested support and after fierce fighting we've lost comms with the base. A QRF has been dispatched to the area and we are able to monitor the area with areal surveillance. At this point we can confirm that we've taken casualties - but we have no specifics. The unit commanders in the theater are doing their best to re-establish comms with the base. We urge Kenyans to remember our soldiers in prayer as well as the innocent Somali's caught up in the conflict. "

If they'd done this GOK would have more credibility than they have at present at least in my opinion. These updates should have continued every two hours on the day in question then every four hours on subsequent days. 

Not three times in three days. The attack shocked all of us not just GOK. 

They needed to come across as being tin the know about the situation as well as empathizing with the situation and leading the nation in this time of crisis. 

They should have been honest with us the GOK isn't the Pope it's not infallible for goodness sake.  

Repatriation of The Wounded: beginning Sunday the wounded survivors from the attack began arriving back in Nairobi and were greeted by the CD Defense and CGS KDF which is okay if they didn't have a horde of reporters snapping away and then proceeded to give standard GOK speeches. The GOK had no right in my opinion to use the pain of the wounded (who saw their friends die in the El Adde attack) as a display to the nation that GOK is working - that was an epic fail, where is the dignity of the wounded and respect for their sacrifice? 

What did parading them before the cameras prove to this nation, especially in the manner that it was carried out? 

That doesn't sit well - where is the honor and dignity of the wounded, when they deplane injured into a forest of pumping hands, whirring lenses and exploding - flashes? 

These are pertinent questions at least in my mind and they need to be answered if El Adde and what happened there is to make us better as a nation, a region, a people and a continent. 

El Adde - you won't forget that name. 

El Adde, Geddo - a name that will live in infamy

The day after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered a speech before the house of congress, December 8th 1941 marked the entry of the United States into WWII as a combatant.


President Franklin D. Roosevelt: Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

In my opinion January 15th 2016 is on of a string of dates (many in my lifetime) which will live in infamy in the history of the Kenyan nation. We all know these dates, some of use have been alive for each of these dates in the history of our nation

1. April 2, 2015 - Garissa Attack 
2. November 23 2014 - Mandera Bus Attack 
3. July 7 2014 - Mandera Quarry Attack 
4. June 15 - 17 2014 Mpeketoni Attack 
5. September 21, 2013 - Westgate Attack 
6. Weekend of November 10th 2012 - Baragoi Attack 
7. December 2007 - February 2008 - PEV 
8. November 28 2002 - Kikambala Attack 
9. August 7th 1998 - US embassy attack 
10. August 1997 - Kayabombo clashes 
11. February 10th 1984 - Wagala Massacare 
12. August 1982 - Kenya Airforce Coup 
13. 1963 - 1967 - Shifta Insurgency 
14. The Mau Mau Emergency

As I write these dates I know it's not an exhaustive list, it's only a partial list and I've tried to hit the major dates for these tragedies that have happened in Kenya. I could complete the list but for two reasons:

1. It's sad, on each of those days, people with hopes and dreams, Kenyans and others have all lost their lives
2. We're a young nation 53 years this December, yet the list above of 14 mass murder events works out to 1 mass murder event every 3.7 years - and that list isn't even conclusive nor does it take into account that some of those events lasted for years. If I was to do an exhaustive list of all the mass murder events in our history that would be a blog post all by itself (maybe I will). As a young nation how much bloodshed and murderous (yes each of those events was cold blooded mass murder) can we take? We're only 53 - what will that list look like in 2063? 

The worst part about these gruesome statistics (that's what they are after we're done with our hashtags and social media condolences) is that we do this to our selves either by being the perpetrators or facilitating the foreign perpetrators before and after the fact. 

Also lets just not have the discussion on how many actual perpetrators (trigger men) and master minds (planners) have ended up in Kenyan prisons as a result of planning theses actions......

Lastly not that I've note included all the bombings that happened in Nairobi & Mombasa over the past 4 years.  

After that extremely long introduction let me get to the purpose of this article, El Adde, that town in Geddo Somalia - that we have all spend the past 72 hours Googling and Tweeting about - where as of now an unknown number of Kenyan soldiers and Somali civilians + Al-Shabaab terrorists have perished, will perish or in the process as you read of this of .... perishing ( I say unknown, because our GOK is mum and you can't believe Al-Shabaab either)

What we know is that people died, soldiers, grand fathers, fathers, sons, uncles, brothers, mothers, daughters, grandmothers, aunties ,sisters, cousins, civilians & terrorists died.

I don't know if for some it was painless (I hope it was) - I'm sure for others it was painful (I hope it was for the terrorists).  Before I continue I'll say one thing - I hope the truth comes out...

From what we know the KDF AMISOM base was attacked at 0530hrs with between one and three VIED (vehicle born, improvised explosive devices) after which following a pattern they have replicated at least twice in the last two years the terrorists then proceeded to rush the base en mass firing automatic weapons and shoulder mounted rockets. From the now banned pictures, circulating on social media we can assume that some of those shoulder mounted rockets were armor piercing.

During this firefight (an this is where we're left hanging) an unknown number of KDF soldiers, were killed and by that would mean that enemy combatants were also killed (historically looking at how ALS - Al-Shabaab - I'm tired of writing their full name - has fared in encountering KDF - they have to have suffered casualties) 

When the firefight was done - reports indicate that the AMISOM base was overrun, KDF soldiers, retreated or fled, some were captured, some were killed and their equipment was seized by ALS.

Over the past three days this has been the information as a nation, we've fed off of and tried hard to process in order to find out if our soldiers are safe.  

Based on this information alone I have a lot of questions to ask, check out my next article..... this one is already too long..... 

Next Post El-Adde a name you won't forget

Our National Anthem - The critique we need right now

I watched today the Report by Denis Okari - Children of a Lesser God, it broke my hear & lit a fire in my guts.

It's a painful piece to watch, I challenge you to view this report on the Garissa University Attack and let it not be a call to examine yourself, let it not be a stirring cry for change for justice for our parents, spouses, children and siblings - yes they are our siblings you know, the parents, spouses, children and siblings of the victims of Garissa.

Think about it.


As the emotions boiled in my guts and the anger rose in my chest making me want to scream and break something - I began looking for someone to blame someone to squarely place the responsibility for this enormous loss of life and the ensuing colossal cock-up & collective amnesia that ensued in our society.
I wanted blood - someone I could look at and curse till the end of time, until the very judgement throne of God Himself - for letting innocent children die with unfulfilled dreams, lost hope for whole families and villages - that person must be there.

The pain and symphony of mediocrity that we go through each day has to be the fault of someone. It's not chance that the majority of Kenyans' live & die like they are foreigners in a country that ostensibly belongs to them.

Guess what I found that person - in the mirror. Seriously check your nearest reflective surface - you'll see the same person to blame - that person is you and me. You shake your head, and probably want to dismiss this as a guilt laden rant of some wanna be blogger. To some extent - your right except it's grief not guilt.

I have been feeling such a sense of sorrow and grief when I look out at our nation and society and it's at a personal level.

Kenyan Coat of Arms

As a Kenyan Citizen I have a charge envisioned during the birth of our nation and entrusted to all who would call the cockerel embossed shield with spears their coat of arms.

To clarify  if you are a Kenyan then this is your coat of arms as well.

So if you are a Kenyan you have a contract a covenant envisioned by the hopes and dreams that founded this nation - The Kenyan National Anthem.

Simply put we are to live the words of our national anthem - otherwise, we might as well replace it with the theme song from Vihoja Mahakamani (Kenyan courtroom TV drama) or something that has no meaning and is hopefully catchy. Our national anthem is not something that we sing for the sake of singing or listen to with swelling pride when our athletes win competitions at the international level. It's a charge, its's a call, its a prayer to God to live by.

Like any prayer it's not a one way conversation, there are things we ask God to do (as only He can) and others that we commit to do.  I firmly believe if we live by this anthem - our nation will the best place on earth, all the definitions are taken from the Miriam Webster Dictionary

That's the first stanza of our national anthem - tell me if we just lived that part each of us, every day would Garissa , Mandera, Longorion, Baragoi, Tana River, Mpeketoni, Matatu Attacks, Westgate, Kikambala, August 8th, Likoni, PEV, Kayabombo, 82 Coup all the way back to the political assassinations of the young Kenya have happened?

Would citizenship be sold in government offices or land  held in trust for the nation, diverted to individuals and families who then fight over it when the patriarch dies?

How would the leadership of this country look? Would individuals looking for elective office need to bribe voters?

Would investigative journalists have heart rending pieces to publish about this nation?

Now while it's true you can't have a perfect country however I think we would get pretty close.. don't you?

Here is the rest of the national anthem:

So you want someone to blame, you want blood, you want someone to kick in the backside for the state of our nation today - you'll find them when you look at yourself in the mirror.

If as a nation we endeavored to live by the words of our national anthem then maybe, just maybe people would line up at 5AM at our embassies for a chance to visit our country instead of Kenyans lining up at 5AM at foreign embassies for a chance to leave.

If we don't live by the national anthem then we are just as guilty as the politicians and civil servants who we regularly point fingers at.

The person for me to blame is me and for you to blame is you..........

Queues + Kenyans

It came to me this week, show a Kenyan a queue and they'll want to get to the front of it. Its like a conditioning that we've all gone through I think.

We have queues everywhere literally, especially in Nairobi; lets list the queues that you'd go through in your average day in the capital of the +254 

• The bathroom
• The iron box
• To exit the estate at rush hour
• To enter the estate in the evening rush hour
• The bank
• The supermarket

If there is a service that a Kenyan needs there is probably a queue.

Lets face it if you don't leave home at a considerably early and insane hour more so with the advent of Kidero's drums (5 AM to start work at 8 AM) your whole commute will be a queue. From the moment you exit the estate to getting a parking slot in town. Jam as you will find out (if you don't already know) can find you inside your estate and escort you slowly all the way to your office. Is it that we are too many people in this city?
I digress though. So basically from the moment you leave the comfy warmth of your bed you most likely face a queue in at some point in your efforts to reach the office. 

Take for example the queue at the bank or at a government office, I challenge you to calculate the amount of time you spend in a queue especially if you live in Nairobi.

What is worse than queues that we face is the behavior of some Kenyans' in those queues, and it is the most annoying thing that you can face in any given day. There types of Kenyans you face in queues:

• Emergency Workers: those who have to get to the front of the line, they overlap shamelessly because as you guessed it - they are on their way to an emergency
• VIP's: they know someone controlling the front of the line so because of their important status they get to skip the line all together
• Needy children: they have no concept of what personal space means. Instead each space they see in front of them is a space they should be in, so close to the person in front of them that they case one shadow. They have no concept of personal space - I strongly suspect that the people in city planning fall in this category
• Touchy People: they love their personal space and are allergic to crowds.

It's like when a Kenyan see's a space in a line, it's in their DNA to fill that space - creating a lifestyle of gridlock

Your thoughts? Comment below

Retreat from Somalia = peace?

“Withdraw KDF from Somalia and we will have peace” this is the message that some leaders and Al-Shabaab have assured Kenyan’s will happen. Actually it’s a variation some Kenyans have added the last part “we will have peace”, Al-Shabaab tell us that we withdraw and they will still continue to attack until all the wrongs perpetuated by non-Muslims on Muslims are avenged (the list of wrongs is long detailed yet vague).

There are many who while not being part of the withdrawal camp do believe that withdrawal is for the best at the very least to prevent the generals continuing to line their pockets with the benefits of Kismayu’s varied exports. Which is happening because the trade in Kismayu continues and whether AMISOM (KDF) exacts a lower tax than Al-Shaabab (which is quite likely given the quiet in that sector) & is a matter of some debate; this incidentally I believe is one of the main reasons for Al-Shabaab’s campaign of terror in Kenya. Kismayu was a major source of revenue for the group because on top of the chance to write the injustice of historical wrongs Al-Shabaab & their jihad does pay well from the accounts of the family members of their adherents, in fact many families comment on how their members join because of joblessness.

To return the main reason for the article will a withdrawal lead to peace?  That peace is possible but that depends on how the withdrawal is accomplished. I shall explain in two steps below:

Withdraw today: this will not guarantee peace, it will embolden Al-Shabaab shift the emputus from the Somali National government as well as the regional authorities that

have sprung up and give them validity and if they can turn that validity into territorial gains they would in short order be back in control of Somalia and then we will have no peace. They will have learned from their first encounter with AMISOM and they would prepare extremely well for the next encounter which will as sure as the dawn come.

If Al-Shaabab controls Somalia the attacks in Kenya and across the region will not stop, with the platform that controlling a country would provide them their next campaign would not be insurgent attacks it may be a campaign of insurgent attacks as well as frontal ones as conducted by Boko Haraam in Nigeria. None of us want that for East Africa – except Al-Shabaab and their adherents.

Withdraw with Goals: our presence in Somalia cannot be open ended, it must be to achieve a specific objective and that objective is to restore a stable government for the people of Somalia that is a participating member of the region taking its rightful place in the development of the people of East Africa.  This must be the ultimate goal of the AMISOM mission.

This AMISOM mission must have a clearly defined timetable of objectives to be achieved (assigned to a time frame where possible) with the people of Somalia having their rightful part to play (they have to have a key stake in the rebuilding of their nation – which it ultimately is). Defeating Al-Shabaab isn't just about militarily defeating them it’s also about building a culture that will resist their attempt to create a narrative of hate and violence.

So in summary there will be peace in Somalia, Kenya and East Africa from the threat of Islamic Jihad when AMISOM withdraws from Somalia – the right way having rebuilt a stable society.

Should we withdraw tomorrow – there will be no peace

Our leaders: They Can't or They Won't

After the April 2^nd Garissa University attack and the postmortem is continuing in all it’s heart wrenching goriness. I can only imagine what the families of the victims including those who are still missing loved ones must be going through.

As details emerge of what went down on the days leading to the attack as well as on the material day itself. A litany of mistakes, gaffes, incompetence and downright treachery by the different people who played a part (willingly or not) in the horror that was meted out on the Kenyans’ who lost their lives at Garissa University.

If I was to write about all the errors they would fill a book. From the security personnel who were given intelligence about the attacks, to the Kenyans who provided for the attackers (with intelligence, logistics, sanctuary and supplies in the lead up to the attack) to the security services who didn't coordinate their response to the attacks (with no coordination so that the actual rescue began at 5 pm in the evening) when the attackers ammunition was almost exhausted and they had killed the majority of their victims.

What really irks me though is looking at the decision makers who are charged with our safety I have to ask myself –if they care for ordinary Kenyans. Because  looking at how our leaders react (throughout the entire levels of leadership)  to the challenges we face in security can only  be explained in one of two ways from the way I see it and neither way bodes well for the future of this country.

Il-equipped: we have equipment to secure and build this country however the application of those tools by individuals at decision making levels exhibits a lack of knowledge despite all their training on how to apply those tools – there seems to be an inflexibility to adapt to situations that require a flexible response to counter them. Taking the issue that is most discussed with respect to Garissa – dispatching of the Recce team to Garissa. 

The attacks began between 0500 – 0600hrs, the commandant of the GSU was on his way to Turkwel that morning to reopen a road that had been blocked by locals. The Recce team was ready to leave for Garissa by 0800hrs. At that time one of the Cessna 208B’s that would have been used by the team was on its way on a training/family flight to Mombasa.

At that point the decision makers would, should have done two things reason would dictate:

Firstly: turn back the 208B to Nairobi, immediately make sure that they requisition whatever air resources would be necessary to take the entire team to Garissa immediately (there are a operators of Dash 8 aircraft at Wilson – the very same ones used to evacuate the wounded; which combined with the 208B that was still at Wilson would have been enough to get the team to Garissa in at most 2 hours.

Secondly: Immediately dispatched the Recce team to Wilson airport – it begs belief that they took two hours in Nairobi traffic – they should have been driven on the wrong side of the road on pavements, dammit through gardens and back yards to get to Wilson.

They should have been at Wilson by 0900hrs to be dispatched by 0930hrs at the latest. While this was happening the person in charge of the Recce team should have been in touch with the security decision makers in Garissa to get the Recce team what they needed to create a plan of attack on the way to Garissa. This would be plans of the buildings (floors, rooms entrances, emergency exits), the layout of the surrounding area (observation points, lines of sight, high grounds and roads) as well as real time intelligence on where the attackers were holed up. The campus was surrounded by security personnel from different commands – the information was readily obtainable from the county offices as well as officers on the ground. This plan is a simple plan it’s not rocket science and anyone who has been to command school, management school anyone making decisions for a nation should have thought of something along these lines.

How is it that the press got to Garissa before the Recce squad and it can’t be money because the government surely has enough of that, so then we have a tool (Recce) that can adopt to complex situations fluidly but a command and control structure that cannot adapt itself to wield the tool in fluid situations. Begging the question, are these, our leaders ill-equipped to adapt to complex security situations. This option assumes that our leaders do earnestly care about our nation’s security but are out of their depth in the face of the current challenges we are facing as a nation – to remedy this we need to equip our leaders better to give them the skills they need to apply the tools of our safety.

Competent but don’t care: which is the worse sin because it would mean that the people in charge with the leadership are first of all don’t care about what they are in those positions to do, their focus is on other things and so instead of being motivated to do the best job they can at all times, which would mean that on their order of priorities keeping the peace is quite low, the peace exists to enable our leaders to continue their most important interests while enjoying the benefits of leadership.

Leadership at all levels whose motivation isn't the mantle of their leadership but something else (whatever that may be) then the people who they lead are worse off. This kind of leadership is reactionary, they don’t seek to adapt and anticipate or improve responses beyond what is necessary to keep their leadership intact. As an author in the Daily Nation said our security leadership while presiding over an archaic inflexible security apparatus run thriving private entities with truly Buffetesque flair.

For your review check out this article in the Daily Nation from April 14th 2015

Could that explain why the most the reactions in the wake of the attack are knee jerk reactions that in the short term will be seen to be doing something while in the long run may not be for the benefit of the people of this nation. As always let’s look at an example:

Security Crackdown: in the wake of the attack the government machinery has swung into gear freezing accounts, blacklisting individuals, closing businesses, demanding the closure of the world’s largest refugee camp (in direct contradiction of international conventions) and building what would be Kenya’s longest wall. These activities paint a worrying picture for me. The financial measures: how long has the government had this list? Unless it’s a PR list – equally as bad isn't it?

Then lets discuss the wall, 700 kilometers long in all its anticipated glory, is that the best use of our resources? Is it guaranteed to improve the safety of this nation? Will that wall keep out of this nation the habits that are killing us? Or are those habits already firmly entrenched within our borders the antithesis of the plenty that should be found in our borders.

Closing of Dadaab – the largest refugee camp on the planet, how much will it cost?

To begin with being that international refugee law doesn't confine refugees to camps and that our government hasn't allocated an adequate budget to the Department of Refugee affairs – what exactly will this accomplish?

How are we sending people back who can’t properly identify or of whom have no exhaustive database of origins, do we see that happening? Visit the Department of Refugee Affairs and find out for yourself.

We all know that the government won’t do a proper job in any of the initiatives taken by the government, none of them will last beyond the first phase and will leave in us (Kenyans) a bitter taste, fear and a suspicion of Somalis’ - it's already happening just talk to your neighbor. 

What I fear this may entrench is a mindset of us vs them – further dividing this nation, wasting our resources and killing us.

These actions then are populist, designed to show us in a very simplistic way that our leaders believe will convince us that they do care about us and that the attacks are not events that distract them from their primary agenda (enjoying the benefits of leadership and furthering their personal enterprise) but serious threats to us the people they care about and who their prime objective is to serve and lead.

Soon everything will return to normal, there will be no accountability for our leaders everything will return to normal and all of us (leaders and the led) will return to our primary objectives – the advancement of our individual enterprise by all at our disposal to the detriment of  all else.

So then you tell me are our leaders ill-equipped or do they just not care about us enough and chose to direct energies to personal advancement with the tools of their office and treat the objectives of leadership as secondary (stability to ensure longevity in office) and ultimately that fault is ours as the fabric of society.

To paraphrase a famous tweet,

“individualism has killed football, cricket and now it’s killing us”

What is the endgame?

It’s April 3^rd 2015 and our nation is reeling once again from a gruesome attack. On April 2^nd gunmen attacked the Graissa University College and as of today at least 147 people have lost their lives in addition to the perpetrators or terrorists or murderers.

The details emerging of the siege at the university are horrible, they cannot be recounted and they are all over the internet. More and more details are emerging and with time, the more detailed and horrible they become.
The murderers targeted an early morning Christian Union prayer meeting; they knew exactly where the students were and they went about their abhorrent mission according to eye witness accounts almost gleefully taunting victims, making them call their parents, referencing Easter – happily executing their evil mission. In some cases the victims called out to Jesus to save them and were immediately shot dead and according to first responders they were mostly shot in the back of the head while lying on the floor.
In my mind it is crystal clear those murderers are having a reckoning with the God of the followers who they killed with ruthless abandon on April 3^rd 2015. I stake my life on the certainty that it isn't a joyful reckoning.
The shock of the attack perpetuated on my country men and women follows a similar pattern to previous attacks carried out against Kenyans in the last five years.
However the attacks and the pattern of the attacks isn't unique to Kenya, East Africa or Africa for that matter. This pattern of attacks where the victims are unprepared noncombatant’s, targeted in places of education, worship or shopping isn't unique to Kenya.
These attacks depending on where they are carried out in the world target Christian’s, Muslims, Hindu’s, atheists or members of other faiths. Unfortunately and I’m not profiling here the perpetrators claiming (correctly or not) to be true Muslims, labelled Islamic radicals or terrorist (depending on who is describing them) are by and large claiming to act in the name of Islam.
The narrative of the ideologies behind the attacks changes based on which region of the world the attack is carried out in. I will illustrate:

1. East Africa: unbelievers attacking Muslim lands or dispossessing Muslim are of their lands and as such are legitimate targets for the revenge being carried out by the attackers who also are on a crusade to bring the law of the Quran back to those wrongfully dispossessed Muslim lands
2. West Africa: unbelievers who have perpetuated injustices against Muslims & Islam and the backup reason of establishing the rule of Islamic law in the areas that “belong” to Islam
3. North Africa: Muslims against Muslims based on tribal allegiance
4. Middle East: that’s where it becomes more complicated but the lines are still the same. It’s  Muslim against Muslim based on the version of their religion (Sunni vs Shia) IS against the Iraqi government or IS against Yazidi Christians in that instance the narrative reverts to version 1, 2 or 3

I’m inclined to see a pattern here of violence always against others with the justification for violence changing based on the theater of application with the only constant being violence.
This in turn leads to the question at least from where I’m sitting, what is the ultimate goal of these different movements in different parts of the world but executing a similar campaign of violence.
Everything has a reason and an objective – so what is the objective of these movements? Will they stop when they conquer their current adversaries? Is it simplistic to believe that they will seize when the current objective is achieved? Will Al-Shabaab seize their campaign against Kenya when as they demand Kenya withdraws her troops & for the Kenyan radicals returns “Muslim lands” to Muslims?
I don’t think that will happen, there will always be a new enemy, a new cause for the “faithful” to take up arms against the “infidel” and the violence will not stop even when the objectives that are fueling the violence are achieved.
In the event that this theory is correct then that means as the violence continues, the more territory and people that the perpetrators take over the greater their capacity of committing violence will become – which brings us back to Al-Shabaab who on Saturday April 4^th promised to wage a long bloody war against the population of Kenya. 

Their attacks in Kenya are out of a sense of desperation a campaign to regain lost territory and an economic base to wage its campaign of violence. It’s a battle born out of desperation for relevance.
Without the territory that they have lost in Somalia they continue to struggle for economic and cultural relevance in their homeland. Without the territory they have lost they will not have an economic base as well as a base of followers (plus access to the population’s contacts in foreign countries – useful when sending foreign fighters to those nations)
In conclusion – the campaign of violence seems unlikely to end:  irrespective of the objectives achieved by the antagonists.

So in that context if the main proponents in each of the four regions of the world where these religious conflicts are being waged achieve their stated short term objectives it will lead to a temporary lull in the overall campaign followed by a period of consolidation of those players into bigger regional movements or supremacy conflicts from which a stronger aggressor will emerge to initiate more campaigns of violence.
To answer the question the end game is violence, followed by conquest, consolidation, expansion followed by more violence and in the unlikely event that global domination is achieved and there is no more resistance – there will still be violence – because this movement cannot exist without violence.
An aside is as long as people refuse to bow to this ideology then there will be violence, attacks, people will get hurt and there will be war and days like April 2^nd 2015 will continue sadly to happen. 

For those who ascribe to their ideology they seem to have committed to either convert their opponents, kill them or be killed. 

What will the rest of us choose..