El Adde - you won't forget that name in this lifetime

As I stated in my post El Adde the name of the town in which an AMISOM outpost manned by KDF was attached on Friday, January 15th 2016 will remain in my mind at least a place that will live in infamy and here's why.

I'll break it down into the following four sections, based on what has been released in the mainstream media (and not so main), internet research and my understanding. I'll also state here for the record that I have not been in contact with any service members of the disciplined forces neither am I one myself. I'm just asking questions:

1. Base Construction
2. Supplies - Logistics
3. Combat Support
4. Crisis Management Response

I've looked using Google Maps for the town of El Adde but it doesn't exist - the one that does is Busaar, Geddo Somalia - which from media reports is quite near El Adde. El Adde is the name of the newest district in South Western Somalia according to Wikipedia so your guess is as good as mine if El Adde is a town as well as a district in Geddo. What I do know for sure is the town exists and there is a structure that looks like a new base near it - but because I have no independent confirmation what is there - I will terminate this line of here.

1. Base Construction

The Gate: We've been told the base was breached by ALS suicide bombers (see my last post) - based on what was learned from the Burundi & Uganda based attacks - the attackers shouldn't have been able to drive at speed at those gates (if they did) there should have been concrete barriers at the base gate to slow down vehicles by making them navigate through the concrete barriers that make you slow down and turn to get through. That section of the gate should have been covered by multiple weapons of different caliber in fixed positions - in addition to the weapons carried by the sentries manning the gates. The area should have been well lit and vehicles should have been forced to navigate the gate one at a time - especially unknown vehicles - using the physical obstructions. 

With three VBIED's (see my last article) the attackers would have been forced to blow them up together in an attempt to clear the concrete barriers - which would have blocked the gate or blow them up one at a time (driving over the previous detonation crater to get deeper - a challenge) - still defenders should have had time with a properly constructed gate structure - to repulse or negate the effect of those VBIED's instead of as we've been told them being able to breach the gate (check mainstream media) - in my opinion. 

Base Perimeter: learning from what ALS did to the AMISOM base manned by UPDF, the base should have been secured by at the minimum multiple rings of physical barriers, in three to four concentric rings , earth berms, sand or stone filled bastions (Hesco Bastion) and a final ring of concrete barriers.  Each of these rings should have increased in height with overlapping arcs of fire (from em-placed weapons) and should probably been mined (manually triggered electronic mines at the vulnerable points) - in my opinion. 
There should even have been a plan for the base occupants to have collapsing fields of fire in the event the perimeters were compromised. 

Perimeter Shape: the shape of the base should have been circular or oval - to prevent attackers from focusing fire on a corner from two different angles but still allowing defenders to cover each other and focus their fire on the same area. From what I've seen online (Google maps) this was the case. 

Fields of Fire: outside the last base perimeter the area outside the first third base perimeter should have then been cleared of vegetation and rocks for a further distance of 200 meters. This area should always have been kept clear of vegetation and then the weapons in fixed positions (mortars and machine guns) should have been ranged to fire at this area (this means the settings to drop a mortar at 150 meters 100% of the time would have been known and marked in the gun emplacements). To counter the threat VIED's - this area should have been mined with anti-vehicle mines - pressure activated (meaning you'd have to drive a vehicle of 1 ton of more over the mine to detonate it - keeps the population safe as well - there are no one ton camels) - the area around the camp would naturally have been marked dangerous in Somali, Kiswahili, Arabic and English.


Mortar Batteries: the base should have had at least two batteries of mortars with a range of 100 - 2000 meters. These batteries should have been ranged the day they were set up. Each batter should have been in easy reach of a magazine. If each battery had 5 mortars and there were two batteries for the whole camp covering different sectors, that's an impressive rate of fire - considering again ALS didn't have entrenched positions outside the base. 




In my opinion the base construction followed those simple rules - the attackers would have had a very hard time breaching the base perimeter - even if there were 80 or so defendants (a company - check media articles)  

2. Supplies - Logistics
The military are masters at logistics and are able to get a pencil from Nairobi all the way to Kismayo where it's needed or a T72 from Ukraine to Nairobi. As with any logistics scenario there are re-order levels (the amount at which more supplies are requested), minimum stock levels (the level below which stores should never drop). If it were up to me as rule of thumb the reorder level for ammunition should have been 7 days. This means that when the base as seven days of ammunition left (7 days of patrols, attacks and drills) the supplies chief would order additional ammunition from the bases logistics base (told you the military is super efficient). If the minimum stock level is three days and assuming the base was at that level - they should have had enough ammunition to fire every single weapon on the base for three days without running out. As a a result the base shouldn't have run out ammunition after a fire fight that lasted a day. Additionally KDF should have had a protocol for emergency resupply of a base under attack - by air drop. The base weapons shouldn't have run out of ammo after one day. 

Taking into account what I've laid out in 1 & 2  ALS should have suffered significant losses attacking the base - even with mass numbers of 500 fighters (without armor, without air support, and without extensive ammunition stores) because KDF wouldn't let ALS build an ammo base near them right? 

The weapons of ALS would have been out ranged by the emplaced weapons of KDF, an AK 47 has a range of 350 meters, an M4 & G3 a range of 500 meters (base models). Taking this into account - they ALS with trees and stones for cover have to get to within 340 meters of the base to shoot effectively - unless they all had light machine guns while the KDF would be behind concrete cover and can shoot at anything within 450 meters effectively (not counting mortars) - do you see how ALS would be having a super bad day? I know having mortars raining down on their heads, anti vehicle mines exploding underneath would not have made ALS more courageous.... 

So what happened - how was this not the case - was the base poorly protected and supplied?

3. Combat Support
El Adde wasn't the only AMISOM base in Somalia it wasn't the furthest KDF outpost in Somalia - it was supported - it had another base supplies came from and it had a bigger base (battalion or division HQ) from where support when an attack happened would come from. This support would take two forms Close Air Support (thank you Hollywood) and a Quick Reaction Force. The company at El Adde should have had redundant forms of communication to their battalion HQ or if they were the battalion HQ then comms to Division and the DoD. It goes without saying these comm channels should have been manned on the receiving end 24//365. So the moment a distress call was received steps should have been taken to activate immediately the forces below:

Close Air Support - is air planes (jets or helicopters) fully fueled and armed for  air to ground missions (KDF has air superiority in Somalia) either in the air or able to get airborne in five to ten minutes. This force would then arrive on station and under the direction of the unit requesting for help rain unholy hell fire and brimstone on the enemy (ALS) heads - again ruining their day. The distance from Nanyuki to Busaar is 653kms the F-5E has a range of 1405kms on internal tanks - meaning it could fly to Busaar and back on internal tanks and still fly for 200kms around the town (loiter time) using internal tanks would free all there external hard points to carry weapons - enabling KDF to bring a lot of pain to bear on ALS. At maximum cruise speed they should have been over El Added in 45 minutes after takeoff. Using a center tank on the F5 would enable the planes to spend more time over the combat area bringing the hurt. KDF should have then had resources to have Close Air Support on station around the base until - the attack was repulsed and the enemy retreated. Get my drift?  Lets not talk about helicopter support  - this examination by itself is enough to prove my point.
Quick Reaction Force -  a column of troops in armored vehicles who can come to the support of base or unit of soldiers under attack.  This force would either be able to reinforce or evacuate a force under attack (such as the El Adde unit). A force arriving behind an enemy attacking a base would be caught between two forces and mowed down. I don't know where the nearest QRF was - I just know there should have been one nearby. This force is launched after assessment has been done that the it's determined the base needs relief. 

So what happened - how was this not the case - was the base poorly protected and supported?

4. Crisis Management
Brace yourself this is where it gets for me really annoying, here I feel the GOK lost the plot and I'll explain:
Information Release: I felt that GOK reacted like they were allergic to releasing information about the attack as a result they denied (which came across as a lie) and ended up having to confirm what third party news sites and unverified sources including the ALS later - thus playing catch up. They let the enemy lead the media war, they lost credibility and were on the back foot - making the situation worse for families of soldiers - no I won't address where or what the President did. 

In my opinion if the GOK said 
0800hrs "This morning at 0530hrs our base was attacked in El Adde, our troops requested support - which was dispatched and we are monitoring the situation, more updates to follow. Our thoughts and prayers are with the soldiers and their families"
1100hrs "An update to our briefing this morning - our base in El Adde requested support and after fierce fighting we've lost comms with the base. A QRF has been dispatched to the area and we are able to monitor the area with areal surveillance. At this point we can confirm that we've taken casualties - but we have no specifics. The unit commanders in the theater are doing their best to re-establish comms with the base. We urge Kenyans to remember our soldiers in prayer as well as the innocent Somali's caught up in the conflict. "

If they'd done this GOK would have more credibility than they have at present at least in my opinion. These updates should have continued every two hours on the day in question then every four hours on subsequent days. 

Not three times in three days. The attack shocked all of us not just GOK. 

They needed to come across as being tin the know about the situation as well as empathizing with the situation and leading the nation in this time of crisis. 

They should have been honest with us the GOK isn't the Pope it's not infallible for goodness sake.  

Repatriation of The Wounded: beginning Sunday the wounded survivors from the attack began arriving back in Nairobi and were greeted by the CD Defense and CGS KDF which is okay if they didn't have a horde of reporters snapping away and then proceeded to give standard GOK speeches. The GOK had no right in my opinion to use the pain of the wounded (who saw their friends die in the El Adde attack) as a display to the nation that GOK is working - that was an epic fail, where is the dignity of the wounded and respect for their sacrifice? 

What did parading them before the cameras prove to this nation, especially in the manner that it was carried out? 

That doesn't sit well - where is the honor and dignity of the wounded, when they deplane injured into a forest of pumping hands, whirring lenses and exploding - flashes? 

These are pertinent questions at least in my mind and they need to be answered if El Adde and what happened there is to make us better as a nation, a region, a people and a continent. 

El Adde - you won't forget that name.