El-Adde - My postscript

I believe this is the end my El-Adde quest, we all lost country men who choose to live a life if service in the defense of this nation.

Our government is silent about what happened and society is slowly moving on, it's attention held by the outrage of the day as revealed to us by the different arms of government and the media (main stream + social)

As I've said previously we can't forget these tragedies, they are an opportunity for us to engage in some self examination as a nation.

Self examination isn't a bad thing, our leaders shouldn't fear it, it gives an opportunity to admit our failings, learn from them and save lives in the future.

Saving lives now and in the future is of paramount importance, I'm sure you'd agree.

The veil of silence swiftly raised around the loss we suffered in El-Adde, does it do justice to the memories of the lives that were lost? Will we have a chance to celebrate these service men who gave the ultimate sacrifice in the service of humanity.I think not

Will we be able to identify and remedy the failings that led to such a massive loss of life? With a veil of silence - there will be no catharsis for the family's and society.

Will we be able to hold those who allowed these failings to account for their errors? I think not with a veil of silence

Holding those who are responsible doesn't end with the elimination of the ALS perpetrators. There are those within the Kenyan establishment who must be held accountable and I'll give you some scenarios in which Kenyans should be held to account:

1. Equipment: should we find that our soldiers had substandard equipment for the area of operations - then the purchasers must be held to account no matter their station in life or office in government
2. Tactics -  If we became complacent in the area of operations then those who allowed such complacency through omission or commission must be held to account no matter their station in life or office in government
3. Personnel - if the personnel at that base were the wrong personnel for that theater of operations through poor recruitment then those responsible for recruitment must be held to account and the process must change. 

We will benefit from self examination, our society will heal and will become better and through becoming better we will heal and in turn be able to bring healing to the people of Somalia (yes it's possible)

Purpose to never forget................

Map Coordinates 2°40'52.99"N, 41°19'40.75"E

The Base In Gedo, Somalia - Part Two

Studying these images and going through the information available, one could write a book and the story of what happened must be told. It's not enough to exact vengeance on the perpetrators of these attacks but our military must learn from what happened and we as a people must learn from what happened. 

Let not those who lost their lives in those attacks and the aftermath (from both sides) not have lost their lives in vain. 

There's another piece of information that contributes to the evidence that this camp is a place that may have been over run in the El Adde Attacks. 

Some Maths: In various news stories we've be told that when air support ( fast jet's)  was dispatched from Nanyuki it arrived on station over El Adde in 30 - 40 minutes. That's an interesting time frame and allow me to explain why.

The current main fighter of our erstwhile air force is the F-5E Tiger II,  which has a combat radius of 1039 kms. Combat radius is the distance a plane can fly from it's base accomplish an objective and return to base before tanks run dry plus minimums. Minimums is the amount of extra fuel a pilot needs to arrive over their destination with in case of any issues over the landing site. 

The camp is exactly 550kms from Nanyuki which means that an F-5 would reach Nanyuki in just under 30 minutes and be able to loiter on station for 30+  minutes before having to return to Nanyuki before it's tanks ran dry. 

With an available carrying capacity (payload) of 3.1 tonnes of weapons or extra fuel (extending the range) which if it was all used for weapons in air to ground mode (as I suspect happens in most missions in Somalia) would make for a long day for the individuals on the receiving end of those weapons. 
 Moving forward the next available images we have a date of 12/22/2014 - these are the last available images online for this area. There are no images for 2015 & 2016.

Image 7

Image 7: The encampment still exists two years later with more buildings and no brand new earth works as seen in 2012.

You will notice that the area isn't as dry as  it was when the last pictures were taken and a new encampment has grown and become attached to the main encampment.

Going clockwise around the image you will notice the following:

Smaller Encampment: This smaller encampment has grown around the main route into and out of the camp and is directly South of the encampment we're focusing on (in the direction of the town)

Open Space: an open slightly slopped area which could be used for training or exercise

Partial Walls:  there are a number of partial walls and trenches to the left side of the images.
To the left of the image is also where you can see the remains of the previous perimeter wall or fence.

You'll notice that the white rectangles in the outer oval have the long side facing the perimeter this would allow two adjacent positions to have overlapping fields of fire - answering the question raised in my previous article. Yes they did have positions with overlapping fields of fire.

The camp has an sense of permanence to it as compared to the 2012 images.

The perimeter has been expanded compared to the 2012 and there is a open area between the perimeter and the first ring of buildings and positions.

Lets focus on four different areas based on the 2014 images.

Image 8

Image 8 a full image of of the entire encampment zoomed in with areas of interest highlighted.

Image A

In  this image we zoom in to the main route into and out of the encampment. You can see that there are two walls both of them unmanned in this image.

The first wall is the green fence which encircles the encampment and the second is narrower& defined by it's shadow it's almost the same color as the earth.

It's distinct shadow though does give an indication of it's height.

It's important to note that there don't seem to be any actual gates or sentry positions around either of these fences. 

There are no shadows in the road to indicate barriers or a gate structure. There is a small shadow to the left just after the second wall which may be a sentry box. There are no obvious weapon positions around the gate although to of the structures at the bottom of the image could be weapon positions covering the gate.
In this encampment the gate structure isn't a secure space and neither is the one in the small encampment. Any attackers using VBIED's would be able to drive at speed into different sectors of the encampment.

In briefings after the attack we've been told how ALS was able to drive at least 5 different vehicles including VBIED's into the El-Adde encampment. 

A gate entrance like this could explain how that happened.

 

Image B

Image C

Image B: you can see what seems to be artillery positions ( the ovals that look like they have watch hands inside them and one opening) these are field artillery pieces surrounded by an earth embankment - Crew Served Weapon (CSW) positions, I won't speculate on the caliber of these weapons. However in this image there are two of them. There is also what appears to be a vehicle parked near the lower CWS position.

There are  at least four positions of the type in this image in various positions of this type around the camp which means that this encampment artillery fire support for itself and nearby military patrols (they point to the east and south east). It also means these weapons would be ranged (they would have calibrated these weapons to know what settings to choose to fire at targets 1km away or 10kms away). Which answers the question I raised on Mortar Batteries.

If this was the camp that was attacked and the attackers came through the smaller SNA camp and the defenders didn't know that the camp had been abandoned, they wouldn't have been able to use the weapons to fire at the direction the attackers were coming from. I raise this question because they should have been able to fire illumination rounds over the SNA camp and the road from the town and then plaster the approaches to the camp with rounds as fast as they could fire.

Image C: you can see several buildings with white roofs surrounded entrenched in the earth, it's possible that the walls of these buildings could have been built using Hesco Bastions (see  El-Adde you won't forget that name in this lifetime) which means that the encampment inhabitants would have shelter from VBIED's unless it was parked right next to a building.

This is good, it shows the inhabitants knew how to fortify buildings.

Conclusion: from the images so far, we can see that the camp's defenses are heavier on the left side of the encampment - the eastern side. There are more walls and less vegetation compared to the right side of the encampment - the western side (it has less barriers and more vegetation). It may have been this is the area the enemy attacked from often.

The cardinal rule though, each side should have been as protected just as the Eastern side was. If encampment was attacked from the eastern side as a decoy and then the main attack came from the western side at dawn or dusk, it would be a confusing situation for the defenders.

Image D

Image D lets look at the perimeter's. You'll see the outer perimeter at the bottom of the image (the green wavy line) it should have been made of thorn bush.

Next going upwards on the image we have the faint green line with a tree in it - this is the old perimeter from 2012, they moved the perimeter outwards. This area that we're in is called a free fire zone and should be absolutely vegetation fee to enable the defenders to shoot anything that crosses the perimeter.
Next we have what seems like a trench or temporary wall.

Lastly the final perimeter before you enter the encampment proper.

On average the distance between the inner barrier and the outer barrier ranges between 75 meters in the North and 90 - 99 meters in the East, South and West - this is good.

The only issue I have with this free fire zone is that isn't absolutely vegetation free. It's also impossible to tell if it's mined from these images. As well I feel the area outside the outermost barrier should have been defoliated for at least 50 meters. These imaged from 2014 do suggest a level of complacency on the part of the base defenders - it could be 15% complacency.

That 15% could be what get you killed when you face your adversary in conflict.

Conclusion
The defense features of this encampment aren't complete (to my liking) but it's not defenseless either. An encampment such as this wouldn't fall to attackers without any air support or artillery easily. It would be a tough nut to crack but still it would crack with the following:

1. Surveillance: the attackers would need to have extensive surveillance of this encampment to determine it's weak points
2. Access: the attackers would need access to the smaller encampment as a mini staging area to enable them to attack the larger encampment at speed and in numbers and to prevent the defenders from using artillery to impede their progress.
3. Timing:  there's a reason ALS attacks bases at dawn (Burundi, Uganda & now Kenya) dawn and dusk are the times of shadows, it can be hard to tell what is moving and not moving. This is why dawn and dusk in a base in an active war zone is the time to stand post - this means every one on base is armed and in body armor facing the fences watching everything and with flood lights on. This time normally lasts for around 30 - 45 minutes. In Africa as we know our sunrise and sunsets are quite fast. If the attacks began before 0530hrs then the defenders (with lights, night vision capability, artillery & the knowledge of the terrain) would have an advantage against an enemy with VBIED's, small & medium arms. 
4. Numbers: the attackers would have to commit a very large fighting force to overwhelm a encampment such as this and would face significant casualties no matter what they may claim afterwards. 

Number 1 & 2 imply some form of cooperation from the locals around the encampment - it wouldn't be possible otherwise. The local populace is implicated if this encampment fell.

If this is the El-Adde Base of KDF there are some things I can and can't conclude - if it was to be attacked at the time these satellite images were taken.

First - what I can't conclude

1. I can't tell you if the defenders had night vision capability
2. If night patrols were conducted from this encampment
3. I can't tell you if they were standing post or about to stand post
4. The competency & experience of the individuals at this outpost

What I can conclude

1. The defenses aren't all encompassing. There are glaring weaknesses that an enemy could exploit and use to their advantage in the right conditions
2. This encampment is vulnerable through complacency in construction
3. Step 1- 3 above would make a difference - a significant one
4. This encampment has at least 200+ inhabitants 
5. This Base would fall if it was attacked at the time these images were taken

The last piece in this series is the El-Adde my post script.

At the very least should this turn out not to be an AMISOM KDF outpost then it's defenses could do with a lot of shoring up. Should it be an ALS encampment..... I won't take that thought to completion. 

The Base In Gedo, Somalia - Part One

I set out to followup on the two articles I'd written after the attack on KDF in El-Adde, Gedo, Somalia.

Initially I''d hoped that with time the GOK would shed light on what happened, so there wouldn't need to be endless speculation on what happened as is wont to happen online where #KOT are involved.

I've been extremely curious to find out how ALS got the better of KDF given everything that's happened in Somalia since 2011.

I wrote two articles El Adde a name that will live in infamy & El Adde you won't forget that name in this lifetime in the latter article I raised a few questions about

1. Base Construction
2. Supplies
3. Combat Support 
4. Crisis Management

Based on information available freely and widely on the internet and correlating that with news articles on the attack I'm following up on Base Construction. 

I believe I did find the base in that may have been attacked by ALS in El Adde and based on what I raised in my second El Adde article I found the answer to some of the questions I raised.
.
If this isn't the El Adde base, it's still a military encampment and it's construction does raise some questions. 

Sources: Based on online articles including ones from The Daily Nation, The Standard and The Star, rescue missions were mounted from El Wak & Damasa in Kenya in response to the attack and surviving soldiers took refuge in a nearby town.
The rescue columns encountered IED's on the road between El Wak and the camp slowing them down. Some soldiers were rescued near the border, others were killed together with a family that sheltered them in the town near the base that was attacked.

With time some things about the attack have become clearer and some things still remain for now unknown.

Image 1

Image 1: Area of Interest:  Using Google Maps I found El Wak in Kenya and followed  the main route into Somalia around 45 kms into Somalia I cam to the first town after Bur Ache about 50 kms down the road.

Searching outward from the town I found just north of the town at a distance of 0.97 kms what can be called an organized encampment

Image 2

Image 2 Encampment: This encampment is oval and seems to have organized defense's as we'll see later in this series.

Taking everything into account I examined this discovery further.

It's important to note that with Google Resources you're able to zoom back & forth through the image catalog over time and that's what I did.



The encampment has multiple rings of excavations and a full enclosure, there's one way into an out of the camp. It looks like a fortified military installation.

Image 3

The images for this specific area are from between 2012 and 2014.

Image 3 You can clearly see the road from the town to the encampment.

Image 4: The latest image shows two circular encampments a smaller one and the larger more organized one.

News articles have clearly stated that the El Adde KDF encampment is accessed through a SNA encampment as is the case in Image 4. The only access road to the larger encampment is through the smaller encampment.

Image 4

Historical Images
Going back to the earliest images of the area Image 5 & Image 6  which were taken on 03/12/2012 we notice a few things.

Image 5

Image 5: 03/12/2012 notice the general dryness of the are represented by the white and gray colors which is dry vegetation. The color of the earth where it's visible is pale orange. 

Inside the enclosure which seems to made of vegetation of some kind, it's lighter than the trees (meaning dryer) but darker than the grass. This means in height it'd be shorter than the trees but higher than the grass. 

Going back to the color of the earth on the you'll notice within the encampment that there are oval rings of excavations - a hole surrounded be dark red earth. You'll notice the ones to the south (nearer the town) are drier (older) and the ones to the north of the encampment are darker meaning the earth in those excavations is fresh compared to the ones in the south.  In addition the excavations in the outside circles are drier than the ones in the inner circle. 

My conclusions on the excavations are that they are Defensive Fighting Positions, Crew Served Weapon Positions and earth works raised around buildings to protect them from incoming fire. 

It's also important to note the entrance to the south towards the direction of the town and there are some old structures which don't have earth works around them. 

In addition it's important to note that the perimeter fence has some gaps in it which are clearly foot paths in and out of the compound and in some areas these paths have been blocked with slightly darker (fresher) vegetation. 

Image 6

Image 6: shows the concentric rings of excavated positions as well as the openings in the perimeter fence. 

Looking at these the oldest images, I believe there is clear evidence of a new and expanding military encampment in 2012. 

I found more images from 2014 which will be in Part Two...... 

Where are the watchmen?

Looking around at our society, the context our time I lose sleep. Sleep flees when you see what is

going on around this nation and compare it with our attitude as a society.

This attitude I believe is defined by what we focus on, our list of national priorities you'd say.

We're embroiled in a multi dimensional conflict for the identity of this nation, if you look back at the crisis points we've been through over the last five to seven years - a worrying trend emerges.

A lot of Kenyan's have been lost in a range of terror related incidents and our adversity is hate filled and motivated to wipe us out. They classify us homogeneously and rejoice at each life they snuff out.

This is serious, looking at the media that our foes publish on the internet you get hit with a sense of discouragement and a temptation to give in to the same doctrine of hate, to retreat behind stereotypes and close the ranks, make it an us versus them affair. It doesn't work that way..... thankfully

The conflicts of our time as I've alluded to in my post What is the end game? the wave of hate across the world isn't aimless and isolated pockets of violence. It's targeted conflict and while the actors may seem separate over time they will continue to coalesce into a single entity with a specific goal.

This isn't a surprise, it's been happening over the last four years especially with the rise of ISIS, the names change the objectives remain the same - let's not lose sight of that.

With all these conflicts, within our borders, on the other side of our borders, clear across the continent and on the other side of the world, take a look at our society at our nation - do we know what times we live in?

Who's pricking our collective conscience, who's opening our eyes to the threats that we face, who's making sure that those who stand in harms way have the best of our resources to keep us safe.

Who's driving the discourse of what it means to be Kenyan, who's leading the way in bringing out the best in us as a people which is the only way to truly win this conflict of our time?

Who's standing in our town halls and social halls (which we don't have) leading the discourse on the bigger picture for our country?

Those are our watchmen, where are they?  ...........

We obsess about money for our county, jobs for our people and our man winning the seat, followed by his man and then the other man.

Our leaders are exposed time and again for stealing money that should be used for making a difference and they go to court and nothing happens and still the money keeps getting stolen.

Each time this happens we get more jaded as nation, we turn to money, the next issue to hold our attention, we retreat behind our tribal, social, economic and financial identities.....

Yet all around us the conflicts continue, drawing closer each day......

Each time there has been a tragedy the things that we lose ourselves in have not saved us.... our tribal, social, economic and financial identities did they make a difference in the lives of those we lost?

Yet we still continue to put our trust and hope in them....

Where are the watchmen? 

El Adde - you won't forget that name in this lifetime

As I stated in my post El Adde the name of the town in which an AMISOM outpost manned by KDF was attached on Friday, January 15th 2016 will remain in my mind at least a place that will live in infamy and here's why.

I'll break it down into the following four sections, based on what has been released in the mainstream media (and not so main), internet research and my understanding. I'll also state here for the record that I have not been in contact with any service members of the disciplined forces neither am I one myself. I'm just asking questions:

1. Base Construction
2. Supplies - Logistics
3. Combat Support
4. Crisis Management Response

I've looked using Google Maps for the town of El Adde but it doesn't exist - the one that does is Busaar, Geddo Somalia - which from media reports is quite near El Adde. El Adde is the name of the newest district in South Western Somalia according to Wikipedia so your guess is as good as mine if El Adde is a town as well as a district in Geddo. What I do know for sure is the town exists and there is a structure that looks like a new base near it - but because I have no independent confirmation what is there - I will terminate this line of here.

1. Base Construction

The Gate: We've been told the base was breached by ALS suicide bombers (see my last post) - based on what was learned from the Burundi & Uganda based attacks - the attackers shouldn't have been able to drive at speed at those gates (if they did) there should have been concrete barriers at the base gate to slow down vehicles by making them navigate through the concrete barriers that make you slow down and turn to get through. That section of the gate should have been covered by multiple weapons of different caliber in fixed positions - in addition to the weapons carried by the sentries manning the gates. The area should have been well lit and vehicles should have been forced to navigate the gate one at a time - especially unknown vehicles - using the physical obstructions. 

With three VBIED's (see my last article) the attackers would have been forced to blow them up together in an attempt to clear the concrete barriers - which would have blocked the gate or blow them up one at a time (driving over the previous detonation crater to get deeper - a challenge) - still defenders should have had time with a properly constructed gate structure - to repulse or negate the effect of those VBIED's instead of as we've been told them being able to breach the gate (check mainstream media) - in my opinion. 

Base Perimeter: learning from what ALS did to the AMISOM base manned by UPDF, the base should have been secured by at the minimum multiple rings of physical barriers, in three to four concentric rings , earth berms, sand or stone filled bastions (Hesco Bastion) and a final ring of concrete barriers.  Each of these rings should have increased in height with overlapping arcs of fire (from em-placed weapons) and should probably been mined (manually triggered electronic mines at the vulnerable points) - in my opinion. 
There should even have been a plan for the base occupants to have collapsing fields of fire in the event the perimeters were compromised. 

Perimeter Shape: the shape of the base should have been circular or oval - to prevent attackers from focusing fire on a corner from two different angles but still allowing defenders to cover each other and focus their fire on the same area. From what I've seen online (Google maps) this was the case. 

Fields of Fire: outside the last base perimeter the area outside the first third base perimeter should have then been cleared of vegetation and rocks for a further distance of 200 meters. This area should always have been kept clear of vegetation and then the weapons in fixed positions (mortars and machine guns) should have been ranged to fire at this area (this means the settings to drop a mortar at 150 meters 100% of the time would have been known and marked in the gun emplacements). To counter the threat VIED's - this area should have been mined with anti-vehicle mines - pressure activated (meaning you'd have to drive a vehicle of 1 ton of more over the mine to detonate it - keeps the population safe as well - there are no one ton camels) - the area around the camp would naturally have been marked dangerous in Somali, Kiswahili, Arabic and English.


Mortar Batteries: the base should have had at least two batteries of mortars with a range of 100 - 2000 meters. These batteries should have been ranged the day they were set up. Each batter should have been in easy reach of a magazine. If each battery had 5 mortars and there were two batteries for the whole camp covering different sectors, that's an impressive rate of fire - considering again ALS didn't have entrenched positions outside the base. 




In my opinion the base construction followed those simple rules - the attackers would have had a very hard time breaching the base perimeter - even if there were 80 or so defendants (a company - check media articles)  

2. Supplies - Logistics
The military are masters at logistics and are able to get a pencil from Nairobi all the way to Kismayo where it's needed or a T72 from Ukraine to Nairobi. As with any logistics scenario there are re-order levels (the amount at which more supplies are requested), minimum stock levels (the level below which stores should never drop). If it were up to me as rule of thumb the reorder level for ammunition should have been 7 days. This means that when the base as seven days of ammunition left (7 days of patrols, attacks and drills) the supplies chief would order additional ammunition from the bases logistics base (told you the military is super efficient). If the minimum stock level is three days and assuming the base was at that level - they should have had enough ammunition to fire every single weapon on the base for three days without running out. As a a result the base shouldn't have run out ammunition after a fire fight that lasted a day. Additionally KDF should have had a protocol for emergency resupply of a base under attack - by air drop. The base weapons shouldn't have run out of ammo after one day. 

Taking into account what I've laid out in 1 & 2  ALS should have suffered significant losses attacking the base - even with mass numbers of 500 fighters (without armor, without air support, and without extensive ammunition stores) because KDF wouldn't let ALS build an ammo base near them right? 

The weapons of ALS would have been out ranged by the emplaced weapons of KDF, an AK 47 has a range of 350 meters, an M4 & G3 a range of 500 meters (base models). Taking this into account - they ALS with trees and stones for cover have to get to within 340 meters of the base to shoot effectively - unless they all had light machine guns while the KDF would be behind concrete cover and can shoot at anything within 450 meters effectively (not counting mortars) - do you see how ALS would be having a super bad day? I know having mortars raining down on their heads, anti vehicle mines exploding underneath would not have made ALS more courageous.... 

So what happened - how was this not the case - was the base poorly protected and supplied?

3. Combat Support
El Adde wasn't the only AMISOM base in Somalia it wasn't the furthest KDF outpost in Somalia - it was supported - it had another base supplies came from and it had a bigger base (battalion or division HQ) from where support when an attack happened would come from. This support would take two forms Close Air Support (thank you Hollywood) and a Quick Reaction Force. The company at El Adde should have had redundant forms of communication to their battalion HQ or if they were the battalion HQ then comms to Division and the DoD. It goes without saying these comm channels should have been manned on the receiving end 24//365. So the moment a distress call was received steps should have been taken to activate immediately the forces below:

Close Air Support - is air planes (jets or helicopters) fully fueled and armed for  air to ground missions (KDF has air superiority in Somalia) either in the air or able to get airborne in five to ten minutes. This force would then arrive on station and under the direction of the unit requesting for help rain unholy hell fire and brimstone on the enemy (ALS) heads - again ruining their day. The distance from Nanyuki to Busaar is 653kms the F-5E has a range of 1405kms on internal tanks - meaning it could fly to Busaar and back on internal tanks and still fly for 200kms around the town (loiter time) using internal tanks would free all there external hard points to carry weapons - enabling KDF to bring a lot of pain to bear on ALS. At maximum cruise speed they should have been over El Added in 45 minutes after takeoff. Using a center tank on the F5 would enable the planes to spend more time over the combat area bringing the hurt. KDF should have then had resources to have Close Air Support on station around the base until - the attack was repulsed and the enemy retreated. Get my drift?  Lets not talk about helicopter support  - this examination by itself is enough to prove my point.
Quick Reaction Force -  a column of troops in armored vehicles who can come to the support of base or unit of soldiers under attack.  This force would either be able to reinforce or evacuate a force under attack (such as the El Adde unit). A force arriving behind an enemy attacking a base would be caught between two forces and mowed down. I don't know where the nearest QRF was - I just know there should have been one nearby. This force is launched after assessment has been done that the it's determined the base needs relief. 

So what happened - how was this not the case - was the base poorly protected and supported?

4. Crisis Management
Brace yourself this is where it gets for me really annoying, here I feel the GOK lost the plot and I'll explain:
Information Release: I felt that GOK reacted like they were allergic to releasing information about the attack as a result they denied (which came across as a lie) and ended up having to confirm what third party news sites and unverified sources including the ALS later - thus playing catch up. They let the enemy lead the media war, they lost credibility and were on the back foot - making the situation worse for families of soldiers - no I won't address where or what the President did. 

In my opinion if the GOK said 
0800hrs "This morning at 0530hrs our base was attacked in El Adde, our troops requested support - which was dispatched and we are monitoring the situation, more updates to follow. Our thoughts and prayers are with the soldiers and their families"
1100hrs "An update to our briefing this morning - our base in El Adde requested support and after fierce fighting we've lost comms with the base. A QRF has been dispatched to the area and we are able to monitor the area with areal surveillance. At this point we can confirm that we've taken casualties - but we have no specifics. The unit commanders in the theater are doing their best to re-establish comms with the base. We urge Kenyans to remember our soldiers in prayer as well as the innocent Somali's caught up in the conflict. "

If they'd done this GOK would have more credibility than they have at present at least in my opinion. These updates should have continued every two hours on the day in question then every four hours on subsequent days. 

Not three times in three days. The attack shocked all of us not just GOK. 

They needed to come across as being tin the know about the situation as well as empathizing with the situation and leading the nation in this time of crisis. 

They should have been honest with us the GOK isn't the Pope it's not infallible for goodness sake.  

Repatriation of The Wounded: beginning Sunday the wounded survivors from the attack began arriving back in Nairobi and were greeted by the CD Defense and CGS KDF which is okay if they didn't have a horde of reporters snapping away and then proceeded to give standard GOK speeches. The GOK had no right in my opinion to use the pain of the wounded (who saw their friends die in the El Adde attack) as a display to the nation that GOK is working - that was an epic fail, where is the dignity of the wounded and respect for their sacrifice? 

What did parading them before the cameras prove to this nation, especially in the manner that it was carried out? 

That doesn't sit well - where is the honor and dignity of the wounded, when they deplane injured into a forest of pumping hands, whirring lenses and exploding - flashes? 

These are pertinent questions at least in my mind and they need to be answered if El Adde and what happened there is to make us better as a nation, a region, a people and a continent. 

El Adde - you won't forget that name. 

El Adde, Geddo - a name that will live in infamy

The day after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered a speech before the house of congress, December 8th 1941 marked the entry of the United States into WWII as a combatant.


President Franklin D. Roosevelt: Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

In my opinion January 15th 2016 is on of a string of dates (many in my lifetime) which will live in infamy in the history of the Kenyan nation. We all know these dates, some of use have been alive for each of these dates in the history of our nation

1. April 2, 2015 - Garissa Attack 
2. November 23 2014 - Mandera Bus Attack 
3. July 7 2014 - Mandera Quarry Attack 
4. June 15 - 17 2014 Mpeketoni Attack 
5. September 21, 2013 - Westgate Attack 
6. Weekend of November 10th 2012 - Baragoi Attack 
7. December 2007 - February 2008 - PEV 
8. November 28 2002 - Kikambala Attack 
9. August 7th 1998 - US embassy attack 
10. August 1997 - Kayabombo clashes 
11. February 10th 1984 - Wagala Massacare 
12. August 1982 - Kenya Airforce Coup 
13. 1963 - 1967 - Shifta Insurgency 
14. The Mau Mau Emergency

As I write these dates I know it's not an exhaustive list, it's only a partial list and I've tried to hit the major dates for these tragedies that have happened in Kenya. I could complete the list but for two reasons:

1. It's sad, on each of those days, people with hopes and dreams, Kenyans and others have all lost their lives
2. We're a young nation 53 years this December, yet the list above of 14 mass murder events works out to 1 mass murder event every 3.7 years - and that list isn't even conclusive nor does it take into account that some of those events lasted for years. If I was to do an exhaustive list of all the mass murder events in our history that would be a blog post all by itself (maybe I will). As a young nation how much bloodshed and murderous (yes each of those events was cold blooded mass murder) can we take? We're only 53 - what will that list look like in 2063? 

The worst part about these gruesome statistics (that's what they are after we're done with our hashtags and social media condolences) is that we do this to our selves either by being the perpetrators or facilitating the foreign perpetrators before and after the fact. 

Also lets just not have the discussion on how many actual perpetrators (trigger men) and master minds (planners) have ended up in Kenyan prisons as a result of planning theses actions......

Lastly not that I've note included all the bombings that happened in Nairobi & Mombasa over the past 4 years.  

After that extremely long introduction let me get to the purpose of this article, El Adde, that town in Geddo Somalia - that we have all spend the past 72 hours Googling and Tweeting about - where as of now an unknown number of Kenyan soldiers and Somali civilians + Al-Shabaab terrorists have perished, will perish or in the process as you read of this of .... perishing ( I say unknown, because our GOK is mum and you can't believe Al-Shabaab either)

What we know is that people died, soldiers, grand fathers, fathers, sons, uncles, brothers, mothers, daughters, grandmothers, aunties ,sisters, cousins, civilians & terrorists died.

I don't know if for some it was painless (I hope it was) - I'm sure for others it was painful (I hope it was for the terrorists).  Before I continue I'll say one thing - I hope the truth comes out...

From what we know the KDF AMISOM base was attacked at 0530hrs with between one and three VIED (vehicle born, improvised explosive devices) after which following a pattern they have replicated at least twice in the last two years the terrorists then proceeded to rush the base en mass firing automatic weapons and shoulder mounted rockets. From the now banned pictures, circulating on social media we can assume that some of those shoulder mounted rockets were armor piercing.

During this firefight (an this is where we're left hanging) an unknown number of KDF soldiers, were killed and by that would mean that enemy combatants were also killed (historically looking at how ALS - Al-Shabaab - I'm tired of writing their full name - has fared in encountering KDF - they have to have suffered casualties) 

When the firefight was done - reports indicate that the AMISOM base was overrun, KDF soldiers, retreated or fled, some were captured, some were killed and their equipment was seized by ALS.

Over the past three days this has been the information as a nation, we've fed off of and tried hard to process in order to find out if our soldiers are safe.  

Based on this information alone I have a lot of questions to ask, check out my next article..... this one is already too long..... 

Next Post El-Adde a name you won't forget